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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
WITH POWER OF SALE
REAL ESTATE FORECLOSURE:
A JUDICIAL DILEMMA*
GRANT S. NELSON**
INTRODUCTION
Two main types of mortgage foreclosure are currently utilized in
this country. The more common type is judicial foreclosure. It may be
used in all jurisdictions, and is the sole method of foreclosure permitted
in at least half of the states. This method utilizes a full judicial proceed-
ing in which all persons having an interest in the real estate junior to the
mortgage being foreclosed must be made parties. After a decree of
foreclosure, the property is sold at a public sale. This method is costly
and often time-consuming.' The other foreclosure method, permitted
in about twenty-five states, is power of sale foreclosure. Under this
method, no judicial proceeding is required. After varying types and de-
grees of notice, the property is sold at a public sale, either by a public
official, such as a sheriff, by some other third party, or by the
mortgagee.
2
In some states utilizing the power of sale method, the deed of trust
is the most commonly used mortgage instrument. The mortgagor-trustor
conveys the real estate to a trustee who holds the property in trust for
the mortgagee-beneficiary until full payment of the mortgage debt. In
the event of foreclosure, the power of sale is exercised by the trustee,
who holds a public sale of the mortgaged property; the sale is usually
not judicially supervised.
Recent constitutional litigation has focused on two common charac-
teristics of power of sale foreclosure: limited notice requirements and
the absence of an opportunity for hearing prior to the foreclosure
* @ 1978, Grant S. Nelson.
** Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
B.A., 1960, J.D., 1963, University of Minnesota.
1. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE
& DEVELOPMENT 5 (1976); McElhone & Cramer, Loan Foreclosure Costs Affected By
Varied State Regulations, 36 MORTGAGE BANKER 41 (1975).
2. As of 1968 power of sale foreclosure was used in Alaska, Alabama,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. Cost and Time Factors in Fore-
closure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR J. 413, 414 (1968).
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sale. 3 As previously indicated, the notice requirements under power of
sale foreclosure vary, but are usually less rigorous than those associated
with judicial foreclosure. Notice, as used here, may be simply notice of
foreclosure or notice of default or a combination of the two. While some
states require that notice by mail or personal service be provided for any
person having a record interest in the real estate junior to the mortgage
being foreclosed, 4 many do not. A few states require only notice by pub-
lication.5 This publication sometimes takes the form of newspaper ad-
vertisement and sometimes consists only of public posting. Other states,
in addition to published notice, require notice either by mail or personal
service to the mortgagor and the owner of the mortgaged' real estate, but
not to junior lienors and others holding an interest zubordinate to the
mortgage being foreclosed.6  A few states attempt to protect those in-
terested parties who are neither mortgagors nor owners by requiring
that the notice of foreclosure be mailed to any person who has previ-
ously recorded a request for such notice.7  Finally, almost no power of
sale foreclosure statutes provide for an opportunity for a hearing prior
to the foreclosure sale.
SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Until recently, it had been assumed that where a mortgagor gave a
power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust, the specific level of notice
required was merely a contractual or statutory consideration, not a con-
stitutional problem. Indeed, in Scott v. Paisley 8 the United States Su-
preme Court stated in dictum in 1927:
Plainly the right of one who purchases property subject to a
security deed, with a statutory power of sale which must be
read into the deed, is no greater than that of one who pur-
3. See Leen, Galbraith & Gant, Due Process and Deeds of Trust-Strange Bedfel-
lows, 48 WASH. L. REv. 763 (1973); Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure Under Power of
Sale-Constitutional Problems-Legislative Alternatives, 28 J. Mo. B. 428 (1972);
Pedowitz, Current Developments in Summary Foreclosure, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
421 (1974); Comment, The Constitutionality of California Trustees Sale, 61 CALIF. L,
REv. 1282 (1973); Comment, Power of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L,
REv. 206, 217-20 (1972); Comment, Due Process Problems of Mississippi Power of Sale
Foreclosure, 47 Miss. L.J. 67 (1976); Comment, Notice Requirements of the Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1110 (1973).
4. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-37-113 (2), (3) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 45-1506(1967); WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.040 (1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-6005
(1963).
5. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (1972).
6. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 45-615 (1973). Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.03
(1947) (personal service on person in possession only).
7. See, e.g., § 443.325, RSMo (Supp. 1975). Some states combine required
mailed notice to all parties having record interest in the real estate together with
mailed notice to any other person who has previously recorded a request for it.
See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 33-809 (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924(b) (West 1976).
8. 271 U.S. 632 (1927).
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chases property subject to a mortgage or trust deed, with a con-
tractual power of sale. The validity of such a contractual power
of sale is unquestionable. In Bell Mining Co. v. Butte Bank, 156
U.S. 470, 477, this court said: 'There is nothing in the law
of mortgages, nor in the law that covers what are sometimes
designate as trust deeds in the nature of mortgages, which
prevents the conferring by the grantor or mortgagor in such
instrument of the power to sell the premises described therein
upon default in payment of the debt secured by it, and if the
sale is conducted in accordance with the terms of the power,
the title to the premises granted by way of security passes to the
purchaser upon its consummation by a conveyance.' In the ab-
sence of a specific provision to that effect, the holder of a
mortgage or trust deed with power of sale, is not required to
give notice of the exercise of the power to a subsequent pur-
chaser or incumbrancer; and the validity of the sale is not af-
fected by the fact that such notice is not given .... 9
Such reasoning, of course, did not take into account the possible
impact of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.10 on power of sale
foreclosure. That case involved the sufficiency of notice to beneficiaries
of a judicial settlement of accounts by a trustee of a common trust fund
established under New York banking law. The only notice given the
beneficiaries of the proceeding was publication in a local newspaper in
strict compliance with the statutory requirements. The Supreme Court
held that the type of notice used must be "reasonably calculated ... to
apprise interested parties .... "" The Court also noted that "[w]here
the names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding
are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than
the mails to apprise them of its pendency." 12
Assuming that the notice requirements of Mullane are applicable to
power of sale foreclosure statutes, and absent a valid waiver by the af-
fected parties of such fourteenth amendment notice rights, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the notice provisions of many state power
of sale statutes are unconstitutional. Certainly those statutes that provide
only for notice by publication must fail the constitutional test, because
Mullane requires that when the names and addresses of interested par-
ties are available (as at least the property owner's nearly always is), at
least notice by mail is required. Under such state statutes no interested
party is guaranteed constitutionally acceptable notice.
While one earlier case suggests that a notice by publication provision
in a power of sale statute violates the Mullane principle,13 only three
9. Id. at 635.
10. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
11. Id. at 314.
12. Id. at 318. See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962)(advertisement insufficient in condemnation); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956) (advertisement insufficient in condemnation).
13 See Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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cases have met that issue squarely.14  In Ricker v. United States 15 the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), under a Maine nonjudicial
foreclosure statute,'6 foreclosed a mortgage securing a direct loan that it
had made to the mortgagors. After the proceedings were completed and
the FmHA conveyed the land to a subsequent purchaser, the mortgagors
sued in federal court to nullify the sale, in part on the theory that the
Maine statute's notice requirements did not satisfy the requirements of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The notice required by
statute, and that actually provided, was published notice for three suc-
cessive weeks. The mortgagors did not see the notices but heard about
the proceedings through rumors and other second-hand sources. The
court held that the published notice "plainly failed to meet" the Mullane
standards and emphasized that published notice will not suffice constitu-
tionally where a party's name and address are known or are very easily
ascertained.1 7 Similarly, in Turner v. Blackburn ' a three-judge federal
court invalidated a North Carolina power of sale statute that provided
for notice only by newspaper publication and posting. The court stated:
"To propose to a homeowner that he trek to the courthouse or spend 20
cents to examine fine-print legal notices, daily for the duration of a
twenty-year mortgage, as his sole protection against summary eviction,
seems to us to offer him nothing of value." ' 9
The statutes that provide for publication plus notice by mail or per-
sonal service only for the mortgagor and the owner of the real estate are
probably also defective because no provision is made for notice to other
interested parties such as junior mortgagees and judgment creditors. It
could, of course, be argued that such parties tend to be sophisticated
commercial lenders able to keep themselves informed of the status of the
senior mortgage. However, it is not clear that even a majority of junior
lienors fall into such a class. Moreover, junior lienors often stand to lose
more than the mortgagor or the owner. Where junior liens exist it is not
uncommon for the mortgagor or the owner to have a smaller economic
stake in the mortgaged real estate than that of an individual junior
lienor.
Those statutes that provide for notice by mail or personal service
both for the mortgagor and the owner and for anyone else who has
14. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Roberts v.
Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975); Turner v. Blackburn,
389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
15. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976).
16. 14 ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 6203-6204 (1965).
17. 417 F. Supp. at 138.
18. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
19. Id. at 1258 (emphasis in original). See Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co.,
410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975). Cf Brown v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 359
A.2d 661 (Del. 1976).
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previously recorded a request for such notice represent a closer case
constitutionally. It is true that under such legislation an interested party
could be wiped out without being provided any notice "reasonably calcu-
lated to provide actual notice." On the other hand, perhaps the relative
sophistication of junior lienors as a class can be recognized in this con-
text; after all, such parties can assure themselves of a constitutional form
of notice by simply requesting it. Probably the only notice provisions that
are clearly constitutional are those that closely approximate the notice
provided to interested parties under judicial foreclosure: at least notice
by mail to all parties who have a record interest in the foreclosed prop-
erty junior to the mortgage being foreclosed. In the last analysis,
perhaps a finding of constitutionality is justified only as to this latter
type of notice provision; whatever the arguments in favor of more lim-
ited notice, the cost and time involved in searching the title for those
who have a record interest subsequent to the mortgage being foreclosed
are minor.
The question remains to what extent a foreclosing mortgagee may
remedy the problem of a constitutionally defective notice provision by
providing more extensive notice to interested parties than the statute
requires. Logically, if such notice was provided to all interested parties,
no person would have standing to challenge the foreclosure and the
statute because no one would have suffered injury.20 In one recent fed-
eral district court decision, the court specifically held that a power of sale
foreclosure complied with Mullane where the mortgagee supplied greater
notice to the mortgagor than the power of sale statute required.
2 1
Moreover, the court in Ricker v. United States 22 emphasized the fact that
the mortgagee did not attempt to notify the mortgagor other than by
complying with the statutory requirement. The court implied that had
the mortgagee made an effort to give actual notice, the foreclosure
would not have been constitutionally defective on notice grounds.
Notwithstanding those cases, because of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,23 there is still doubt that a fore-
closing mortgagee has the ability to conduct a constitutional power of
sale foreclosure by supplying necessary notice not required by the
applicable statute. In Wuchter the Supreme Court held that a nonresident
motorist service of process statute that required only service on the sec-
retary of state violated the fourteenth amendment due process clause
even though the secretary of state in that case actually mailed notice to
the nonresident defendant. While this case seems unsound because no
one was injured as a result of the statutory notice provision, its existence
20. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
21. United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
22. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976).
23. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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should make mortgagees cautious as to their ability to resurrect invalid
foreclosure statutes through their own resources.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POWER OF SALE-
HEARING PROBLEMS
Independently of the constitutionality of notice provisions, power of
sale statutes frequently have been attacked on the ground that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the opportunity
for a hearing before a person may be deprived of a significant property
interest. This attack is centered on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.24 and
Fuentes v. Shevin.25 In Sniadach the Supreme Court held that, except in
exceptional circumstances, prejudgment garnishment without provision
for a judicial hearing prior to the garnishment violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Fuentes, a 4-3 decision, the
Court struck down certain state replevin statutes because they did not
provide for an opportunity to be heard before chattels were taken from
the possessor, even on a temporary basis, pending a trial on the merits.
At least three principles were established in Fuentes:
1. Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity
for a hearing before the state authorizes its agents, on the
application of another, to seize property in the possession of
a third person. A bond requirement is not a sufficient substi-
tute for a hearing.
2. The debtors, who had already made substantial payments
under installment contracts, had a sufficient property in-
terest to invoke fourteenth amendment protection even
though they lacked full title to the goods.
3. The hearing requirement is applicable whether or not the
items to be seized are "necessities."
Based on Fuentes, a strong argument may be made that power of
sale foreclosure statutes which do not provide the opportunity for a
hearing prior to the foreclosure sale violate the due process hearing re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment. If Fuentes requires some type
of hearing before chattel security may be seized even temporarily, surely
it may be argued that the due process clause does not permit the perma-
nent taking of real estate security by passage of title with no opportunity
for a hearing at all. Several courts that have reached the hearing issue
directly have utilized Fuentes to invalidate power of sale provisions.20 In
Turner v. Blackburn,27 which invalidated the North Carolina power of sale
24. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
25. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
26. See Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v.
Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co.,
382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F.
Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975).
Contra, Guidarelli v. Lazaretti, 233 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1975).
27. 389 F. Supp. '1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
[Vol. 43
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statute, the three-judge federal court held, based on Fuentes, that a hear-
ing prior to foreclosure and sale is essential. At a minimum, due process
"requires the trustee to make an initial showing before the clerk or simi-
lar neutral official that the mortgagor is in default under the obligation;
the mortgagor must of course be afforded the opportunity to rebut and
defend the charges." 2 8 In Ricker v. United States 29 the government ar-
gued that in the context of a Maine nonjudicial mortgage foreclosure the
opportunity to be heard would be "mere surplusage" because the issues
were "open and shut": the existence of an overdue debt and a valid
mortgage. The federal district court rejected this argument on two
grounds. First, the simplicity of issues does not necessarily obviate the
constitutional necessity for a hearing. Second, in the case at hand the
mortgagors had also challenged the validity of the government's decision
to foreclose on the theory that the mortgage notes lacked consideration.
The court concluded that, at a minimum, fifth amendment due process
requires "a hearing at which [mortgagors] could challenge both the legal
right of the [mortgagee] to foreclose and the propriety of the decision to
do so." 30
Some temporary concern existed that a subsequent Supreme Court
decision had deprived Fuentes of its strength. In Mitchell'v. W.T. Grant
Co.3 1 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana
sequestration statute which required the secured creditor to come before
a judge who, based on a verified complaint delineating the specific facts
supporting the claim, could then issue a writ of sequestration. There was
no right to a hearing prior to the seizure of the chattel, but the proce-
dure did provide for an immediate right to a hearing thereafter and
dissolution of the writ if the plaintiff failed to establish adequate
grounds for its issuance. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart con-
cluded that Mitchell, in effect, had overruled the Fuentes decision.3 2 How-
ever, the subsequent decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.3 3 made it clear that Justice Stewart's prediction of Fuentes' demise
was premature. The Court struck down a Georgia prejudgment gar-
nishment statute that did not provide for a hearing prior to the imposi-
tion of the garnishment remedy. The Court distinguished Mitchell by
noting that, unlike the Louisiana procedure, the garnishment writ was
issued by a clerk, not a judge, upon an affidavit stating only conclusory
and non-specific supporting grounds for the garnishment.34 Moreover,
the Court noted that, unlike Mitchell, there was no opportunity under
28. Id. at 1259.
29. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976).
30. Id. at 139.
31. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
32. Id. at 629-36.
33. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
34. Id. at 606-07.
7
Nelson: Nelson: Constitutional Problems with Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the Georgia statute for an early post-seizure hearing to demonstrate at
least probable cause for the garnishment.35
The significance of the foregoing for the power of sale foreclosure
hearing problem is two-fold. First, the North Georgia decision sets to rest
the argument that Fuentes has been overruled and therefore has no ef-
fect on power of sale real estate foreclosure. Second, in view of the fact
that Fuentes is still good law, the impact of the Mitchell case really does
not weaken the lower federal court cases considered earlier that invali-
date the power of sale statutes on Fuentes hearing grounds.30 The
Louisiana statute was upheld in Mitchell in large measure because the
statute guaranteed the right to an early post-seizure hearing. Power of
sale foreclosure statutes, on the other hand, usually make no provision
for a hearing at any time, before or after the final deprivation of the
mortgagor's real estate. Thus some type of hearing prior to the foreclo-
sure sale is probably required. Indeed, in Garner v. Tiri-State Development
Co.,37 a post-Mitchell but pre-North Georgia case, the federal trial court
held that the Michigan power, of sale statute violated the fourteenth
amendment due process clause because no opportunity for a hearing
was provided at all. The Garner court focused on the fact that in Mitchell
a judge issued the writ of sequestration and, more importantly, that
there was a right to a hearing immediately after the seizure. Thus, the
court concluded: "Evaluated by these criteria the foreclosure by adver-
tisement method now before the court fails to meet due process re-
quirements. The procedure used has no provision for a hearing before
or immediately after the seizure." 38
It has been argued that there is in fact an opportunity for a hearing
under most power of sale statutes because a mortgagor has the right,
based on either common law or statute, to bring suit to enjoin the fore-
closure sale. In some jurisdictions this is a common practice and is a
primary vehicle for developing the law of mortgages in the power of sale
context.39 While at least one court has found this argument persua-
sive,40 others have rejected it.4 1 To equate the foregoing procedure
with the constitutional right to a hearing required by Fuentes seems ques-
tionable for several reasons. First, what Fuentes seems to be saying is that
the opportunity for a hearing must be an integral part of any statutory
procedure that can be used to deprive a person of a property interest.
35. Id.
36. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
37. 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
38. Id. at 380. Accord, Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.
Ga. 1975).
39. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 432.
40. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
41. See, e.g., Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975);
Northnp v. Federal Nail Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 43
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The mortgagor's ability to bring a separate injunction suit normally
exists independently of any power of sale statute. To maintain that the
ability to bring such an injunction suit satisfies the constitutional hearing
requirement would be analogous to contending that a 42 U.S.C. section
1983 injunction suit filed by a tenured college professor to prevent his
termination would be a constitutionally permissible substitute for a hear-
ing requirement as an integral part of the college's termination proce-
dure.42 One court has aptly characterized the injunction suit as a form
of "self-help" that does not meet the requirements of either Fuentes or
Mitchell.43 Second, where the remedy sought is a temporary injunction,
the mortgagor must post an injunction bond. 44 Such a requirement
seems to condition unfairly the mortgagor's right to a hearing on his
ability to pay. It is true, of course, that a mortgagor could avoid the
bond requirement in many jurisdictions by simply bringing an action for
a permanent injunction. However, although such an action deters many*
mortgagees from proceeding with the sale, it does not guarantee such a
result. Third, for the mortgagor to bring a separate injunction suit in-
evitably will require the services of a lawyer. On the other hand, even an
impecunious mortgagor at least would be able to answer a summons and
appear to state his case without counsel at a hearing required as part of
a statutory procedure.
WAIVER PROBLEMS
Even if a power of sale foreclosure statute is constitutionally defi-
cient as to notice and hearing, such rights, in theory at least, are capable
of being waived. In this connection, several cases are important. A few
weeks prior to Fuentes, the United States Supreme Court in D.H. Over-
myer v. Frick Co.45 and Swarb v. Lennox 4 6 rejected a fourteenth amend-
ment due process argument and sustained the constitutionality of certain
state statutes authorizing summary entry of judgment based on confes-
sion of judgment clauses contained in promissory notes. These cases
stand for the proposition that "under [the] appropriate circumstances, a
cognovit debtor may be held effectively and legally to have waived those
rights he would possess if the document he signed had contained no
cognovit provision." 47  In Fuentes itself, the Court recognized that
waiver was possible, but rejected it in that case. The Fuentes contract
provided that "in the event of default of any payment or payments,
Seller at its option may take back the merchandise." 48  Other contracts
42. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
43. Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
44. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.10 (1973); Dobbs, Should Security Be Required As A
Pre-Condition To Provisional Injunctive Relief., 52 N.C.L. REv. 1091 (1974).
45. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
46. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
47. Id. at 200.
48. 407 U.S. at 94.
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provided that the seller "may retake" or "repossess" the merchandise in
the event of a "default in any payment." 49 These "waivers" were inef-
fectual for several reasons: the contracts did not provide specifically for
a waiver of constitutional rights nor did they specify how or through
what process "the seller could take back the goods"; there was a lack of
awareness by the parties of the significance of the waiver; and there was
no bargaining over contractual terms between parties who were equal in
bargaining position.50
Two pre-Fuentes cases determined that the presence of a power of
sale in the mortgage or deed of trust constituted the mortgagor's waiver
of notice and hearing rights,5 ' but subsequent decisions have rejected
such an approach. 52 In Turner v. Blackburn,53 for example, the court
emphasized that there was a presumption against waiver. In rejecting
waiver, the Turner court pointed out that there was no waiver of specific
constitutional rights, that the purported waiver language was in fine
print, and that there was no evidence that the mortgagor was made
aware of the significance of that language. Other courts have stressed
that merely consenting to foreclosure pursuant to state law is not a suffi-
cient substitute for a delineation of the specific constitutional rights
waived. 54 Moreover, in Ricker v. United States55 the court noted that
even if the waiver of specific rights had been spelled out, the
government-mortgagee did not show that the mortgagors "were actually
aware or made aware of the fine print now relied on as a waiver of
constitutional rights."56  The court also emphasized that when the
mortgage was executed the mortgagors were elderly, ill-educated, and
without the services of an attorney.57
The foregoing illustrates that the waiver concept will not be a prac-
tical solution to the constitutional problems of power of sale foreclosure.
If a valid waiver depended only upon ensuring that the waived rights
are specified and the mortgagor is aware that he is waiving those
rights, a carefully drafted document probably would suffice. For exam-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 95-96.
51. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Huggins v. De-
ment, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412, appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188
S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
52. United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Ricker v.
United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F.
Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Law v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
53. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
54. Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976); Northrip v.
Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975).
55. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976).
56. Id. at 139.
57. Id. at 139-40. See United States v. White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss.
1977).
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ple, the mortgagee could have a mortgagor execute a separate recorda-
ble document in bold type that clearly specifies a waiver of constitutional
rights to notice and hearing and that further contains a statement by the
mortgagor that the waiver has been fully explained to him. Although
even this type of document could engender later disputes as to whether
the mortgagor actually understood the significance of the waiver, most
title examiners probably would be willing to rely on such a document in
approving a title derived from a power of sale foreclosure. If, on the
other hand, as Fuentes and other cases suggest, a valid waiver depends
on such factors as equality of bargaining position and similar considera-
tions, an impossible burden is placed on the title examiner.58 How can
an examiner, evaluating a five-year-old mortgage foreclosure, determine
from the record that there was equality of bargaining position? Is there
ever equality of bargaining position? Would a recorded statement con-
temporaneous with the original mortgage certifying that such equality
existed suffice? For title examiners who by nature rely primarily on the
record, the waiver concept becomes an almost impossible burden and, to
the extent that titles thereby become unmarketable, waiver must be con-
sidered an impractical concept.
Even assuming that title examiners could be convinced that a fool-
proof waiver could be developed to bind a mortgagor, it is doubtful that
such a waiver would also be effective against holders of subordinate in-
terests in the mortgaged real estate. If, in fact, there is a presumption
against waiver and if a party must be made aware of what rights are
being waived, how can waiver be accomplished with respect to sub-
sequent grantees of the real estate or junior mortgagees? They, after all,
are not parties to the original mortgage transaction, yet they often have
a significant financial stake in the mortgaged real estate. It could be ar-
gued that such parties take their interests on notice of the record and
that they therefore implicitly consent to the terms of previously recorded
documents.5 9 However, it is doubtful that constitutional rights can be
waived in such a manner. Moreover, whatever the likelihood that sub-
sequent grantees and junior mortgagees will search the record prior to
taking their ipterest in the mortgaged real estate, it is less likely that
either judgment creditors or mechanics lienors will make such a search.
It would, indeed, be stretching the waiver concept to conclude that these
latter parties could have waived notice and hearing rights. Accordingly,
since the waiver concept may well prove unworkable as a practical matter
with respect to some parties, it probably cannot be relied upon at all.
THE STATE ACTION PROBLEM
The fourteenth amendment requires sufficient notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing; it is, however, fundamental that state action must
58. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 433-34.
59. Id. at 431.
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be found before the amendment is applicable. Unless sufficient state ac-
tion is found in connection with power of sale foreclosure, a court will
not reach the notice or hearing issues, no matter how deficient a statute
may be in those respects. Interestingly, some of the early power of sale
fourteenth amendment cases resolved the constitutional issues without a
consideration of state action.60 However, the issue has become increas-
ingly important, and the trend of the case law is clearly against finding
state action.61 This trend is significant because, as a practical matter, it
means that power of sale statutes continue to provide an effective fore-
closure method for nongovernmental mortgagees even where the stat-
utes are noticeably deficient in the notice and hearing area.
At least five theories have been advanced to find state action in the
power of sale foreclosure area.62 These are the "direct" state action
theory, the "encouragement" theory, the governmental function theory,
the judicial enforcement theory, and the "pervasiveness" theory.
Under the first theory, state action exists when state officials act di-
rectly to enforce rights arising from a state statute. Fuentes illustrates this
theory. State action was found, albeit without analysis, because the reple-
vin statute provided for the writ to be issued by a clerk of court and the
service of the writ and seizure of the property to be carried out by the
sheriff. This theory was used in the mortgage context in Turner v.
Blackburn. 63 Under the North Carolina power of sale statute, certain
relatively unusual powers were conferred on the clerk of court. For
example, within thirty days after the receipt of the sale proceeds, the
person holding the power of sale had to file a final report with the clerk.
The clerk then audited and approved the final report and filed it. The
filing of the report and the lapse of a ten-day period was a precondition
to the trustee's power to convey to the highest bidder at the foreclosure
sale. During the ten-day period the clerk had the authority to reject or
accept an upset bid. This was held to constitute direct participation by a
state official and thus state action for purposes of the fourteenth
60. See Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970); Huggins v. De-
ment, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412, appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188
S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
61. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v.
Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kenly v. Mira-
cle Properties, 412 F. Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz. 1976); Lawson v. Smith, 402 F. Supp.
851 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Y Aleman Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 414 F. Supp.
93 (D. Guam 1975); Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc), ap-
peal dismissed, 423 U.S. 909 (1975). Contra, Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp.
1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
62. See Barklage, Constitutional Law-Mortgages--Extra-Judicial Mortgage Fore-
closure Not State Action, 41 Mo. L. REv. 278 (1976).
63. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
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amendment. On the other hand, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected
this argument in Federal National Mortgage Association v. Howlett 64 because
the intervention of public officials was limited primarily to ministerial
functions performed by the recorder of deeds.6 5 While the direct state
action theory was useful in Blackburn, its impact in the power of sale area
is limited because most power of sale statutes do not inject state officials
into the process to the same extent as did North Carolina. In many
jurisdictions a power of sale foreclosure will normally be consummated
without the knowledge, much less the participation, of any public official
other than perhaps the recorder of deeds.6"
The "encouragement" theory asserts that state action may be found
when state statutes tend to "encourage" objectionable, but otherwise pri-
vate, activity.67 The case most representative of this concept is Reitman
v. Mulkey, 68 where state action was premised on the adoption of a con-
stitutional amendment that protected a person's right to refuse to sell or
rent his property to anyone for any reason. The United States Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 vote, concurred in the finding of the California Supreme
Court that the sole purpose of the amendment was to invalidate state
anti-discrimination statutes, to prohibit their future enactment and to
create a constitutional right to discriminate.6 9 Thus the state became at
least a "partner" in racial discrimination in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
It can be argued that the existence of state power of sale foreclosure
statutes encourages this method of foreclosure and therefore is state ac-
tion for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. However, most courts
have rejected this argument,7 0 advancing at least three reasons for doing
so. First, Reitman involved racial discrimination and there is some indica-
tion that such cases will receive "special scrutiny" for state action pur-
poses. 7 1 Second, power of sale statutes do not encourage nonjudicial
foreclosure because the method existed prior to its authorization by the
64. 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
65. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975). But see
Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co.. 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
66. See, e.g., § 443.320-.330, RSMo (Supp. 1975), Tzx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 3810 (Vernon 1966).
67. See Comment, Power of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
206, 217-18 (1972).
68. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
69. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1966).
70. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Bryant v.
Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Federal Nat'l
Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
71. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975). See
also Comment, supra note 67, at 217-18.
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legislature.7 ' Third, the extension of the "encouragement" theory to
power of sale foreclosure would subject a vast range of private conduct
to fourteenth amendment coverage, since statutes regulate so many
forms of private activity and to some extent encourage such activity.
73
The governmental function theory would find state action when a
private person performs a function that is essentially governmental in
nature.7 4 Perhaps the classic example of this theory is found in Marsh v.
Alabama,7 5 where a "company town" was held to the same first amend-
ment standards as a municipal corporation.7 6  On the other hand, the
Supreme Court recently has refused to expand this concept to such ar-
guably quasi-municipal functions as covered mall shopping centers.
7 7 It
could be argued that power of sale statutes have delegated the tradi-
tional governmental function of judicial foreclosure to private parties.7 8
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument in
confronting the Texas deed of trust power of sale statute in Barrera v.
Security Building and Investment Corp.79 The court found that there was
no state action based on a governmental function theory because foreclo-
sure of the mortgagor's equity of redemption had never been the exclu-
sive prerogative of the state. The court noted that extrajudicial foreclo-
sure dated back to 1774. Thus, the trustee exercising a power of sale was
not deemed to be performing a governmental function.8 0
72. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.
1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975);
Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
73. See Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc
1975); Comment, supra note 67, at 217-18. Many power of sale cases have
utilized decisions under section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
permits "self-help" repossession of secured chattels. These cases have found no
state action under UCC § 9-503 and, inter alia, have rejected the "encourage-
ment" theory. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).; Turner v.
Impala Motors, 502 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Bitchell Optical Labs. Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487
F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973).
74. See Barklage, supra note 62, at 280.
75. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
76. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private trustees' management
of park on segregated basis was determined to be a governmental function);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pre-primary elections with no apparent
state involvement held subject to the fifteenth amendment).
77. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
78. See Muller, Deed of Trust Foreclosure: The Need for Reform ... Fair Play and
the Constitution Revisited, 29 J. Mo. B. 222, 229 (1973).
79. 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975).
80. See Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977); North-
rip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975); Federal Nat'l Mtg.
Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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Under the judicial enforcement theory state action exists when state
courts enforce the rights of private parties. The origin of this theory is
Shelley v. Kraemer,8" in which the Supreme Court held that specific judi-
cial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constituted state action
and was violative of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
If Shelley were extended to power of sale foreclosure, it could be argued
that judicial enforcement of power of sale mortgages would constitute
state action. Where such foreclosures ultimately entail intervention by a
court, either in the form of a sheriff ejecting a holdover mortgagor or in
a subsequent quiet title suit based on the foreclosure, judicial recognition
of the mortgage agreement arguably could be considered state action.
However, most power of sale foreclosures are accomplished with no sub-
sequent judicial second-guessing, making the Shelley concept inapplicable.
The Supreme Court has refused to apply the Shelley concept outside of
the racial covenant area and to some extent has restricted its scope.
8 2
The Missouri Supreme Court in Howlett refused to apply the Shelley
theory to power of sale deed of trust foreclosure. It noted that title
passed by virtue of the trustee's deed and without judicial intervention;
courts were used only when mortgagors do not surrender possession. In
such a situation, the court noted, possession is obtained by an unlawful
detainer action in which the Missouri courts are not permitted to inquire
into the merits of title. Thus, courts are not involved in the process by
which title passes.8 3 This reasoning is problematic. If a mortgagor
brings a subsequent suit in equity to set aside a power of sale foreclo-
sure, a court would be called upon to enforce the private agreement,
and the logic of Shelley would be inescapable. Perhaps the better ap-
proach is simply to say that the Shelley concept should not be extended
beyond the racial covenant area; otherwise judicial enforcement of every
private agreement could be brought within the state action ambit .
4
Finally, state action is sometimes found under a "pervasiveness"
theory. Under this concept state action exists when statutory regulation
pervasively governs otherwise private conduct. This theory, however, was
81. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
82. The other Supreme Court decision to apply Shelley was Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), a case involving a suit for damages for breach of a
racial covenant. The Court avoided Shelley in Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267 (1963), a sit-in case involving racial segregation in public accommodations.
More recently the Court rejected the application of the Shelley concept in Evans
v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), where a state court ruled that a trustor's intention
to provide a park for whites only could not be carried out and that therefore the
property reverted to his heirs. The Supreme Court held that the state court
ruling did not constitute state action under the fourteenth amendment.
83. See Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Mo. En
Banc 1975).
84. See Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
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rejected by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 5
where an attempt was made to find state action in a public utility termi-
nation of services. According to the Court,
[the] mere fact that a business is subject to State regulation does
not by itself convert its action into that of the State for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the fact that
the regulation is extensive and detailed, as in the case of most
public utilities, do so .... [T]he inquiry must be whether there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the chal-
lenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.8
The Barrera court rejected the application of this theory to the Texas
power of sale statutes. It found the nexus between state and private ac-
tivity required by Jackson to be absent and determined that in its ab-
sence state regulation alone is not sufficient to establish state action. 87
The foregoing illustrates that, absent a rather unusual power of sale
situation such as existed in North Carolina8 8 (where public officials are
significantly involved), it will be difficult to establish the state action re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment. By finding no state action, many
courts avoid the myriad of complex constitutional issues considered ear-
lier. These include: the form of notice which is required; whether all
parties, including junior lienors, should be entitled to notice; and the
type of hearing which is required, judicial or otherwise. By avoiding
these difficult issues such courts apparently defer to legislatures which
are perhaps better equipped to deal with them.8 9
THE GOVERNMENT AS MORTGAGEE:
"FEDERAL AcTION" PROBLEMS
Where power of sale constitutional litigation involves a direct in-
strumentality of the state or federal government as the mortgagee,
courts cannot avoid the constitutional issues of notice and hearing. Even
though a court would find that a particular state power of sale statute
lacks the requisite state action when a private party is the mortgagee, the
presence of the government as a mortgagee provides the "governmental
action" necessary to reach the constitutional issues. If the foreclosing
mortgagee is a direct instrumentality of the state, the fourteenth
amendment state action requirement is readily satisfied. If the foreclos-
ing mortgagee is a direct federal instrumentality, then the requisite "fed-
85. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163(1972) (state licensing and regulation of a private club not sufficient to find state
action).
86. 419 U.S. at 350-51.
87. Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1171-72 (5th Cir.
1975).
88. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
89. See Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1174 (5th Cir.
1975).
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eral action" exists, and a court will apply fifth amendment due process
standards to test the constitutionality of the foreclosure.
It is a relatively common practice for a direct instrumentality of the
federal government to be a foreclosing mortgagee in state court under
local power of sale statutes. This situation will arise, for example, where
direct loans made by the Veterans Administration (VA) or the Farmers
Home Administration (FmHA) under various government programs are
foreclosed.9 0 It also could occur where the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration (FHA) opts to take an assignment of an FHA insured mortgage
that is in default and then forecloses. 9 1 For example, in Ricker v. United
States 92 the FmHA foreclosed a mortgage under a Maine nonjudicial
foreclosure statute. The mortgagors brought suit to invalidate the fore-
closure in federal court. Because the government was the mortgagee, the
federal district court went directly to the fifth amendment notice and
hearing issue and invalidated the foreclosure. Had this foreclosure in-
volved a private mortgagee, the challenge would have been under the
fourteenth amendment. Given the trend of the case law, state action
probably would not have been found, and the merits would not have
been reached.
Difficult federal action issues arise when the mortgagee is either the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) or the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). Both entities are quasi-federal
and purchase large quantities of mortgage loans on the secondary mar-
ket.9 3 They commonly foreclose mortgages under power of sale statutes
with respect to those mortgage loans they have purchased and which
subsequently go into default. Are these entities the "federal government"
for purposes of the fifth amendment due process clause? Courts thus far
have concluded that FNMA is not.94 Until 1968, FNMA was wholly
owned and administered by the federal government. In 1968 Congress
changed its status to a federally-sponsored private corporation whose
purpose was to provide a secondary market for residential mortgages.
9 5
The stock is completely privately owned, but the President of the United
States appoints five of the fifteen members of the Board of Directors. 6
The federal government regulates FNMA in many respects, such as es-
tablishing debt limits, approving the sale of stock, and requiring that a
certain portion of its mortgage purchases be related to furthering the
90. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 511-12; United States v.
White, 429 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
91. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 511.
92. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976). See United States v. White, 429 F. Supp.
1245 (N.D. Miss. 1977).
93. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,supra note 1, at 483-84, 486-87.
94. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975);
Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Scott, 548 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1970).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(b) (1970).
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development of low and middle income housing.97 In Northrip v. Federal
National Mortgage Association,98 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
found that FNMA, while evidencing "significant" federal involvement,
should not be treated as the federal government for fifth amendment
purposes when it forecloses mortgages. The court thought that Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 99 which found no state action involved in a public
utility's termination of customer service, represented an analogous case.
According to the court in Northrip, "here as in Jackson there is not a
'sufficiently close nexus' between the state and the challenged act of
foreclosure." 1 00
The FHLMC poses a somewhat more difficult federal action prob-
lem. It was created in 1970 by Congress to strengthen the secondary
market in federally insured and conventional mortgages. Its stock is
wholly owned by the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks. 10 1 The Board
of Directors is composed of the three members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the members of which are appointed by the President
of the United States. 02 Although there is no case law in point, FHLMC
probably should be treated as the federal government for purposes of
the fifth amendment. While Congress clearly intended to make FNMA a
private corporation,' 0 3 FHLMC is more substantially tied to the federal
government. There is, for example, no private market for FHLMC
shares as is the case with respect to FNMA. Moreover, because the direc-
tors are Presidentially appointed, FHLMC's day-to-day operations are
inevitably more significantly intertwined with the federal government
than those of FNMA.
Even where the federal government is not the mortgagee, it has
been argued that federal action may exist where the mortgage being
foreclosed was initiated pursuant to a federally subsidized and regulated
program. Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co.'0 4 illustrates this type of situation.
The mortgage being foreclosed under a Georgia power of sale statute
was initiated under section 235 of the National Housing Act and sub-
sequently sold to FNMA, the foreclosing mortgagee.10 5 The section 235
program was designed to encourage homeownership by low income
groups; to accomplish this goal, the federal government makes mortgage
assistance payments to the mortgagee on the mortgagor's behalf.'06 The
economic effect of the program is to reduce the cost of the mortgage to
97. 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(h) (1970).
98. 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975).
99. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
100. 527 F.2d 23, 32 (6th Cir. 1975).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (1970).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1970).
103. See Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 32 (6th Cir. 1975).
104. 410 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Ga. 1975).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(a) (1970).
106. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 542.
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the equivalent of a mortgage with a one percent per annum interest
rate.10 7 Private mortgagees who take part in the section 235 program are
extensively controlled by federal statutes and regulations.'0 8  In Roberts
the federal district court concluded that even though no state action
existed for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, the combination of
federal subsidy to the mortgagor and substantial federal regulation of
the mortgage transaction resulted in federal action for purposes of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. In an ambiguous opinion,
the Fifth Circuit reversed and determined that the federal government's
involvement was insufficient to sustain a finding of federal action. 10 9
Even though the presence of FNMA as the foreclosing party was not
emphasized in the district court's reasoning, the court of appeals stressed
the fact that FNMA is not a federal instrumentality. Although the Fifth
Circuit rejected the pervasive federal regulation and participation argu-
ment, its opinion failed to confront the significance of the financial sub-
sidy provided by the section 235 program.
As more courts invalidate power of sale foreclosures by federal or
quasi-federal agencies or if courts become more willing to find federal
action in connection with federally subsidized and regulated mortgage
programs, an interesting two-tier foreclosure system may develop.
Where federal action is found, foreclosures under such state statutes
probably will be held to violate the notice and hearing requirements of
the fifth amendment. However, continued use of power of sale foreclo-
sures by other mortgagees, at least in non-federally subsidized situations,
will be permitted because the statutes themselves probably do not repre-
sent state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. The result
could be that "federal" foreclosures may have to be judicial while "pri-
vate" power of sale foreclosures may continue.
The "federal" role as mortgagee, either as a result of direct loans or
because of activity in the secondary market, is substantial. Moreover,
federal subsidy programs for privately held mortgages are also signif-
icant and, under those programs, even where a private mortgagee fore-
closes, the costs of foreclosure are usually borne by the federal govern-
ment." 0 Therefore, federal pressure for constitutional and workable
state foreclosure procedures without the full formality of judicial fore-
closure may become significant. Local institutional lenders who sell loans
on the "federal" market or who participate in federal subsidy programs
could also become a force for legislative change of state power of sale
statutes.
107. Id
108. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715z(b) (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 235 (1977); U.S. DEPT
OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., HANDBOOK No. 4155. 1, MORTGAGE CREDIT ANALYSIS (July 25,
1972).
109. 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. See generally 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.355-.417 (1977).
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SOME FURTHER PROBLEMS
In the event a court surmounts the state action problem and deter-
mines that a particular power of sale statute is unconstitutional, the ques-
tion arises whether a sale held under such a statute will be classified as
void or merely voidable. If the sale is rendered void, no title passes in
law or equity. Thus the sale purchaser, whether the mortgagee or a
third party, cannot obtain title of any kind and no title would pass to
subsequent purchasers."1  On the other hand, if the constitutional sale
is only voidable, the right to set aside the foreclosure and regain the land
will be cut off as against any purchaser for value without notice. 1" 2 Few
cases have considered this problem. Ricker v. United States,113 in holding
that a nonjudicial foreclosure under a Maine statute violated the notice
and hearing requirements of the fifth amendment due process clause,
avoided classifying the foreclosure as either void or voidable; instead, the
court determined that the subsequent purchasers from the federal gov-
ernment were not bona fide, since the original mortgagors stayed in pos-
session and since recorded documents established that the foreclosure
was nonjudicial. "Under Maine law a purchaser at a foreclosure sale
cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser where, as here, it ap-
pears from documents and facts known at the time of purchase that
there may be a substantial defect in the seller's claim of title." 1 14 The
court may be correct in its assertion that the mortgagors' continued pos-
session gave subsequent purchasers notice of their claim, thus depriving
them of bona fide purchaser status. However, the mere presence in the
public records of a document indicating that nonjudicial foreclosure had
been employed is hardly tantamount to notice of a defect in the title. At
present the law is far from clear on the constitutional issues; if the
United States Supreme Court, or a majority of lower federal decisions,
firmly establish that foreclosures without notice and hearing are uncon-
stitutional, then it will be fair to say that purchasers who trace their titles
through foreclosures conducted thereafter lack bona fides. That time is
not here yet. The Ricker court's holding would make it virtually impossi-
ble for any person to claim BFP status and hence would in effect make
all such foreclosures void; that view is simply unreasonable at this stage
of the law's development.
For the coi~ntless thousands of people in the United States who may
"own" land whose title was derived from a foreclosure sale under an
arguably unconstitutional power of sale statute, the above problems are
hardly theoretical. Unless they have been in possession for the applicable
111. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 280.
112. Id. at 281. See also Dingus, Mortgages-Redemption After Foreclosure Sale in
Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 261 (1960).
113. 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976).
114. Id. at 140.
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period to establish adverse possession, they may not own their land. The
few cases invalidating power of sale foreclosure have not dealt with this
problem. However, as a practical matter, if a court is to invalidate a state
power of sale statute, it virtually will be compelled to make the decision
prospective only. Although it has been the traditional rule that newly an-
nounced constitutional doctrines are given retroactive effect, the Su-
preme Court has been loath to do so when there are important overrid-
ing societal considerations." 15 Given the substantial reliance on the
power of sale foreclosure method in this country, a retroactive applica-
tion of unconstitutionality could cloud countless titles and result in
enormous volumes of costly litigation.'1 6 This is especially true in in-
flationary periods when rising land values will encourage potential
claimants to upset past foreclosure sales. In fact, the spectre of retroac-
tivity doubtless encourages courts to find other methods, such as the lack
of state action, to avoid reaching the constitutional questions involved in
power of sale foreclosure. Whatever standards the United States Su-
preme Court has applied to the retroactivity question in the past in the
criminal and other areas, the practical necessities would seem to dictate
prospective application of unconstitutionality in the power of sale situa-
tion.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Assuming fourteenth amendment state action exists, many state
power of sale statutes are deficient on notice grounds, and nearly all fail
to satisfy the -constitutional hearing requirement. As we have seen,
waiver of the rights to notice and hearing, as a practical matter, simply
will not work. 1 7 While many courts have avoided the constitutional
problems by utilizing the "no state action" approach, this cannot be the
long-range solution to the problem.
The reason the "no state action" approach can at best be only a
temporary expedient is because of the two-tier situation discussed ear-
lier." 8 It is true that if courts continue to follow the "no state action"
approach, private mortgagees can in theory continue to utilize current
power of sale foreclosure. Whatever standards the United States Su-
preme Court has applied to the retroactivity question in the past in the
amendment state action. However, as Ricker so graphically illustrates,
mortgagees that are federal agencies for purposes of the fifth amend-
ment due process clause will not be able to utilize such foreclosure stat-
115. See G. GUNTHER. CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 546 (1976); Mishkin, The High Court,
the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965);
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33
U. CHI. L. REv. 719 (1966); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
116. See Barklage, supra note 62, at 284.
117. See text accompanying notes 45-59 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 90-103 supra.
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utes because such foreclosures will be unconstitutional. These federal
mortgagees, as noted earlier, may include such quasi-federal agencies as
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) as well as di-
rect federal instrumentalities. In addition, federal action may be present
where federal subsidy programs are involved. State agencies which hold
mortgages, such as state housing finance agencies, will also be subject to
analogous fourteenth amendment standards.
In theory, of course, the federal government may be satisfied with
judicial foreclosure in foreclosures by federal agencies or under federally
subsidized programs, even though private mortgagees continue to use
power of sale statutes. However, this is not the likely result, if for no
other reason than judicial foreclosure is both more time-consuming and
costly than its power of sale counterpart. 119 The more probable result is
that there will be federal pressure on large private institutional lenders
to encourage the enactment of new foreclosure legislation that meets
constitutional standards yet retains the power of sale feature.
It is quite possible to enact workable legislation that meets such
standards. First, as has been noted earlier, if a statute requires notice by
mail to all parties of record subordinate to the mortgage being fore-
closed, the constitutional notice requirement can be satisfied. Such notice
could be mailed to each subordinate party at the address provided in the
recorded document that evidences such party's interest in the real estate.
Moreover, it is possible for the legislation to provide for a hearing and
still retain a power of sale feature. For example, the statute could re-
quire that a two-part postcard be mailed to all the subordinate parties
described above. The postcard would apprise them, in simple non-
technical language, of the foreclosure proceeding, and inform them that
if a hearing is desired the second half of the postcard should be re-
turned by mail to the court. If any cards are returned, a judicial hearing
would be scheduled. However, if no cards are returned the mortgagee
or trustee would be free to exercise the power of sale contained in the
mortgage instrument without any judicial intervention. The latter result
would, in fact, be likely; even judicial foreclosure actions culminate with
a high percentage of default judgments. Such legislation thus may retain
the cost saving advantage of the power of sale foreclosure and yet meet
constitutional requirements. Such legislation should be seriously con-
sidered.
Finally, a decision by the United States Supreme Court is badly
needed to clarify the merits of the constitutional issues. Such a decision
probably should involve a federal, quasi-federal, or state agency in order
to obviate the state action argument. In this context the Court would be
in a position to detail appropriate standards for both the notice element
(which can be inferred fairly readily from the Court's prior decisions)
119. See McElhone & Cramer, supra note 1.
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and the hearing requirement (which, in the foreclosure situation, is
given only meager guidance from prior cases). A new decision of this
type would give strong impetus to the movement for reform of state
statutes as legislatures brought them into line with the Court's holding.
In this context the state action argument would be irrelevant, foreclosure
would become much fairer to those whose interests it cuts off, and
further costly and wasteful constitutional litigation would be unneces-
sary.
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